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AN EMPIRICAL LOOK AT A TKINS V VIRGINIA AND
ITS APPLICATION IN CAPITAL CASES
JOHN H. BLUME*
SHERI LYNN JOHNSON**
CHRISTOPHER SEEDS***

I. INTRODUCTION

In Atkins v. Virginia,the Supreme Court overruled Penry v. Lynaughl and
declared that evolving standards of decency prohibit the execution of
individuals with mental retardation. 2 Both supporters and opponents of a
categorical ban on executing persons with mental retardation were quick to
criticize the majority opinion.3 Dissenting, Justice Scalia argued that exempting
people with mental retardation from the death penalty would promote sport
litigation, where defendants feigning mental retardation would, without penalty
or risk, make spurious Atkins claims.4 He urged:
[o]ne need only read the definitions of mental retardation... to realize that
the symptoms of this condition can readily be feigned. And whereas the
capital defendant who feigns insanity risks commitment to a mental institution
until he can be cured (and then tried and executed), the capital defendant who
feigns mental retardation risks nothing at all. 5
As evidence of both the number and frivolity of Atkins claims about to
swamp the courts, Justice Scalia pointed to the fact that since the docketing of
Atkins, the Court had already received petitions from death-sentenced inmates
who had never previously claimed they had mental retardation.6
On the other side of Atkins, commentators found rampant malingering
unlikely, if not impossible, but worried that the Court's opinion left too much

* Professor of Law, and Director, Cornell Death Penalty Project, Comell Law School.
Professor of Law, and Co-director, Cornell Death Penalty Project, Cornell Law
School.
Adjunct Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. The authors thank Grant Resick for
his dedicated research assistance.
1. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989).
2. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002).
3. See infra notes 7-10, 13.
4. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 353 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This newest invention promises to be
more effective than any of the others in turning the process of capital trial into a game.").
5. Id. (citations omitted).
6. Id. at 354 (citing Moore v. Texas, 535 U.S. 1044 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting from
grant of application for stay of execution)).
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room for reluctant states to evade Atkins. 7 Although the Court did endorse the
prevailing clinical definitions of mental retardation, some advocates of a
categorical mental retardation ban expressed concern that the language the
Court used-communicating that states must "generally conform" to these
definitions-9 -was ambiguous enough to permit death eligibility to vary
depending upon the jurisdiction in which the defendant was charged.' 0 More
than "general conform[ity] would be needed to assure uniformity," because
accurately assessing mental retardation requires adherence to the definition's
operational principles, such as considering the standard error of measurement
when assessing intelligence test scores, or community supports when
determining adaptive functioning deficits.'l Other supporters focused on the
7. See, e.g., Douglas Mossman, Atkins v. Virginia: A Psychiatric Can of Worms, 33
N.M. L. REV. 255, 276-77 (2003) ("[E]xamination of diagnostic criteria suggests that mental
retardation is hard to fake successfully, because the criteria require evidence that retardation
began during childhood-evidence, that is, that the condition existed years before the defendant
committed a capital crime.... Moreover, in considering Justice Scalia's concern, it is important
to recognize that assessing malingering is a core skill for mental health clinicians ....).
8. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3, 317 n.22 (citing with approval AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION,

AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992) (hereafter AAMR 9th ed.) ("Mental retardation
refers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is characterized by significantly
subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more
of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social
skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work.
Mental retardation manifests before age 18."); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed. 2000) [hereafter
DSM-IV-TR] ("The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning that is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in
at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living,
social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic
skills, work, leisure, health, and safety.")). The AAMR is now the American Association on
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities. The clinical field increasingly employs the term
"intellectual disability." See Robert L. Schalock, et al., The Renaming of Mental Retardation:
Understandingthe Change to the Term Intellectual Disability, 45 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILrrIES 116, 116 (2007) (explaining that change in terminology within AAIDD involves no
change in definition). We use the term "mental retardation," because it was used by the Court in
Atkins.
9. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 n.22 (noting that "[tihe [State] statutory definitions of
mental retardation are not identical, but generally conform to the clinical definitions...").
10. See Peggy Tobolowsky, Atldns Aftermath: Identifying Mentally Retarded Offenders
and Excluding Them From Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 77, 78 (2003); Alexis Krulish Dowling,
Comment, Post-Atkins Problems with Enforcing the Supreme Court's Ban on Executing the
Mentally Retarded,33 SETON HALL L. REV. 773, 810 (2003); see also Mossman, supra note 7,
at 275 ("The result could well be that, when states implement the Atkins ban, some will do so in
ways that will permit execution of persons whom many mental health professionals would deem
mentally retarded.").
11. See AAMR, MENTAL RETARDATION DEFINITION,CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF
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fact that Atkins left to the states a number of crucial procedural issues, such as
the identity of the fact finder, the stage of the proceedings at which mental
retardation should be determined, and the appropriate burden of proof.12
These criticisms may in part reflect the ideology of the critics, and to that
extent, are untestable. But the criticisms also contain empirical predictions that
may be evaluated. Have the courts been inundated by a barrage of mental
retardation claims, as Justice Scalia envisioned? Are most mental retardation
claims brought by capital defendants patently frivolous? Do some states
systematically treat mental retardation claims more harshly than others? Do
differences in success rates correlate with either substantive or procedural
variations?
This Article presents preliminary data relevant to these questions.
Elsewhere, we have considered the rationales of selected lower court decisions
in some detail. 13 Here, by contrast, we abjure that kind of analysis, and instead
report overall patterns and, from them, draw some tentative inferences. We
attempted to gather all of the mental retardation cases adjudicated in the six
years since Atkins was decided. We searched for all reported decisions and
augmented the reported cases by posting queries on e-lists seeking additional
adjudicated cases. Our data set clearly does not include every Atkins claim
raised to date: Undoubtedly, there are mental retardation claims that have not
yet been adjudicated, claims that have been adjudicated but not reported (and
not revealed by our queries), and some new challenges-even to older casesthat have yet to be filed. We believe the first group-mental retardation claims
filed, but not yet adjudicated-to be the largest. Although in Texas, which has
a very large death row, we believe almost all of the mental retardation claims
have been initially adjudicated, anecdotal information suggests that in some
states with smaller death rows, fewer than half of the filed cases have been
ruled upon.
It is possible that the cases we have not captured are skewed in some ways
but not possible for us to know in what ways. For example, it may be that the
more meritorious cases are resolved quickly, or that the least meritorious cases
are resolved first, or that the clearest cases-weakest and strongest-are

SUPPORTS 13, 14, 17, 58 (10th ed. 2002); AAIDD, USER'S GUIDE: MENTAL RETARDATION
DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 12 (10th ed. 2007); ROBERT L.
SCHALOCK & Rum LucKAssoN, CLINICAL JUDGMENT (AAMR, 2005); Tobolowsky, supra note

10, at 96.
12. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (leaving "to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate
ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon its execution of sentences") (quoting Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986)); see also Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker,
Atkins v. Virginia: Lessonsfrom Substance andProcedurein the ConstitutionalRegulation of
CapitalPunishment,57 DEPAUL L. REv. 721, 724-30 (2008).
13. See John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, & Christopher Seeds, Of Atkins andMen:
Deviationsfrom ClinicalDefinitionsof Mental Retardationin DeathPenaltyCases (Cornell J.
of Law & Pub. Policy, Paper No. 09-001, 2009), availableathttp://ssm.com/abstct= 1327303.
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decided most quickly. Moreover, some Atkins decisions we have included will
be appealed, and, as a result, the status of some of the claims that we have
designated as "winning" or "losing" will change. Despite these caveats, we
think our data shed some light on the nature of post-Atkins litigation of mental
retardation claims in capital cases and raise some questions that have not
previously been discussed in the literature.
We report three basic findings. First, Atkins has not opened floodgates of
non-meritorious litigation. Second, the success rates for Atkins claims vary
dramatically between states. Third, as compared to their representation on death
row, African-American defendants both file and win a disproportionately high
number of Atkins claims.
II. THE RATE AND MERIT OF A TKINS LITIGATION
Justice Scalia's Atkins dissent predicted that "[t]ime will tell" if courts
would experience an overwhelming number of frivolous Atkins claims. 14 Six
years later, this fear has not been borne out.
There are more than three thousand death row inmates. We found 234
cases adjudicating the substance of Atkins claims, which implies that about
seven percent of all death row inmates have filed Atkins claims. Because there
may be a small number of Atkins claims that have not yet been adjudicated by
any court, or not yet resulted in a published opinion, this may slightly
underestimate ultimate filings attributable to Atkins. Nonetheless, it is now
obvious that the overwhelming majority of death row inmates have not alleged
mental retardation and ineligibility for execution under Atkins.
The data also refute the Atkins dissent's prediction that Atkins filings would
be largely frivolous. Nearly forty percent of all defendants who allege mental
retardation have, in fact, proved it. 16 This is substantially higher than the
frequency with which defendants succeed on allegations of incompetence to
stand trial, allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, or any other claim of
which we are aware. Indeed, the overall rate of reversal of death sentences
encompassing all claims raised at all stages of appellate litigation is
approximately forty percent.' 7 More broadly, we are aware of no civil claim for
which plaintiffs recover in forty percent of the cases filed. Of course, this is not
to say that none of the Atkins filings are frivolous, but only to say that by any

14. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 353-54.
15. See Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.dpic.com (last viewed May 12,
2009).
16. Our data show that thirty-eight percent of Atkins claims have won, while sixty-two
percent have not.
17. James S. Liebman, et al.,A Broken System: ErrorRates in CapitalCases, 1973-1995
13 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No. 15,2000),
availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=232712, at 7 (taking into account cases adjudicated on
direct appeal, in state post-conviction proceedings, and in federal habeas corpus).
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reasonable standard, Atkins has not generated an unusual amount of frivolous
litigation.
A caveat to this analysis of the national data is that the number of pleadings
and the win-loss rates differ markedly between states. For example, North
Carolina has adjudicated at least twenty-one Atkins claims and has determined
that seventeen defendants have mental retardation. By contrast, Alabama courts
have adjudicated at least twenty-six Atkins claims and have found only three of
those claims meritorious. Thus, the success rate in North Carolina is about
eighty percent, and that in Alabama is about twelve percent. The direction of
this discrepancy corresponds with the availability of funding for postconviction litigation: Alabama has minimal funding and low win rates; North
Carolina has adequate funding and higher win rates.1 8 Moreover, Alabama,
unlike North Carolina, defines mental retardation more restrictively than do
either of the professional organizations cited by the Supreme Court; it applies a
strict IQ cutoff4 9 and assesses adaptive functioning deficits by focusing on what
the claimant can do rather than focusing, as those clinical definitions require,
on the individual's limitations. 20 This suggests that success rate may be related
to the jurisdiction's general sensitivity to capital cases, the state courts'
interpretation of the Atkins requirement that it "generally conform" to clinical
definitions of mental retardation, or both.
III. WINS AND LOSSES, PRONG BY PRONG
The Court in Atkins approved a three-pronged clinical definition of mental
retardation. 2' The first prong of the definition is that an individual must exhibit
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning.22 The second prong requires
that the individual experience significant limitations in adaptive functioning,
which is measured by categories that relate to everyday living experiences in a
typical (i.e., non-institutional) community environment.2 3 The third prong
requires that these limitations must have manifested before the person reached
the age of eighteen. 24 To satisfy the first requirement, a person must perform "at
least two standard deviations below the mean of an appropriate assessment
18. North Carolina also has, in our opinion, a reasonably sensitive post-conviction system
overall.
19. See ExpartePerkins, 851 So. 2d 453,456 (Ala. 2002) (demanding that "a defendant,
to be considered mentally retarded, must have significantly subaverage intellectual functioning
(an IQ of 70 or below) ....).
20. See Tarver v. State, 940 So. 2d 312, 330-31 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (Cobb, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part from unpublished memorandum on return to remand).
After remand, the trial court revoked its finding that the defendant had mental retardation.
21. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,308-09 n.3 (2002) (quoting AAMR and DSM-IVTR definitions).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id
HeinOnline -- 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 629 2008-2009
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instrument, considering the standard error of measurement for the specific
'2 5
assessment instruments used and the instruments' strengths and limitations.
Put differently, performance on one of these standardized intelligence tests
must place the person in the lowest two percent of the population.
To meet the second prong, regarding significant limitations in adaptive
functioning, a person's ability to deal with the demands of the everyday world
must be impaired. 27 The operational principles behind the second prong
presume that "[l]imitations in present functioning must be considered within
the context of community environments typical of the individual's age peers
and culture" and that "[w]ithin an individual, limitations often coexist with
strengths. ' 28 "None of the diagnostic criteria for mental retardation include an
exclusion criterion,, 29 which means that diagnosis of a mental illness does not
preclude diagnosis of mental retardation.
The third criterion, onset before eighteen, is the most straightforward of the
three, although it is important to note that the defmitions do not require a
qualifying standardized test score before the age of eighteen, which might
depend upon the school system the defendant attended, but only that the
disability has manifested before that age.3 °
Courts have found that the majority of losing claims, approximately fiftysix percent, failed both the first and second prongs. 3' The remaining losing
cases are almost evenly split between prong one and prong two losses, with 32the
rare case (less than two percent) losing for failure to prove juvenile onset.

25. AAMR, supra note 11, at 12.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 8-9.
29. DSM-IV-TR, supranote 8, at 47. See generallyBlume, Johnson, & Seeds, supra note
13; Richard J. Bonnie & Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge of Implementing Atkins v.
Virginia: How Legislaturesand Courts CanPromoteAccurate Assessments andAdjudications
ofMental Retardationin Death PenaltyCases, 41 U. RICH. L. REv. 811 (2007) (discussing the
significance of the standard error of measurement and other practice effects in assessing IQ
scores).
30. See generallyPenny White, TreatedDifferentlyin Life, But Not in Death, 76 TENN. L.
REv. 685 (2009) (examining how state definitions often deviate from these principles).
31. See infra Table 1; see, e.g., Woods v. Quarterman, 493 F.3d 580,587(5th Cir. 2007)
(affirming denial of habeas relief on Atkins claim after finding petitioner failed all three prongs).
32. See Table 1.
HeinOnline -- 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 630 2008-2009
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TABLE I"
LOSING CASES: LOSSES BY PRONG

Multiple prongs
Intellectual functioning (Prong 1) only
Adaptive functioning (Prong 2) only
Onset (Prong 3) only

Number of
Losing Atkins
Claims
80
24
24
2

Percent of Total
Losing Atkins
Claims (144)
56%
17%
17%
1.4%

A. Prong1 - IntellectualFunctioning: Win Rates and Averages
The clinical definitions of mental retardation take account of the risk of
error in any intelligence test measurement. Accordingly, they incorporate the
standard error of measurement (SEM) and other psychometric principles that
identify the uncertainty inherent in statistical measures.34 The AAIDD defines
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning as "[p]erformance that is at
least two standard deviations below the mean of an appropriate assessment
instrument, considering the standard error of measurement for the specific
35
assessment instruments used and the instruments' strengths and limitations."
Similarly, the DSM-IV-TR states that "it is possible to diagnose Mental
Retardation in individuals with IQs between 70 and 75 who exhibit significant
deficits in adaptive behavior. 36 With results in that range, the clinical literature
advises thinking of the first prong of the Atkins assessment as a gateway to a
rigorous assessment of adaptive functioning.37 Employing a strict IQ score
33. The cases do not always state explicitly the prong on which an Atkins claim loses.
Many appeals summarily affirm trial court determinations that a claimant does not have mental
retardation or summarily deny a federal habeas petitioner's motion to file a successive petition
based on an Atkins claim. In these situations, barring a more illustrative concurring opinion or
dissent, see, e.g., Exparte Taylor, No. WR-48498-02, 2006 WL 234854, at *1-6 (Tex. Crim.
App. Feb. 1,2006) (summarily affirming trial court determination of no mental retardation, but
concurring opinion explains that claimant possessed qualifying IQ scores and lost on prongs 2
and 3), affdsub nom. Taylor v. Quarterman, 498 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2007), no reported history
of the specific strengths and weaknesses of the Atkins claim generally exist. The remaining
percent of the cases we reviewed fell in this category.
34. The most prominent in addition to the SEM are the practice effect and Flynn effect.
See Blume, Johnson, & Seeds, supra note 13, at 9.
35. AAIDD, supra note 11, at 12; AAMR, supra note 11, at 13, 14, 15, 17, 58. The
Supreme Court acknowledged this as well in Atkins, noting that "'[m]ild' mental retardation is
typically used to describe people with an IQ level of 50-55 to approximately 70." Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 309 n.3 (2002) (emphasis added).
36. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 8, at 41-42 ("It should be noted that there is a measurement
error of approximately 5 points in assessing IQ, although this may vary from instrument to
instrument (e.g., a Wechsler IQ of 70 is considered to represent a range of 65-75).").
37. AAIDD, supranote 11, at 24 (stating that "IQ scores alone cannot precisely identify
HeinOnline -- 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 631 2008-2009
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cutoff of 70, by contrast, may wrongly exclude some individuals with mental
retardation from Atkins's protection. Y
An examination of the IQ scores reported for winning Atkins cases reflects
jurisdictional variations. Over 60 percent of the claims that win on the first
prong involve claimants who did not have any reported IQ scores over 70.
Thus, a majority of winning claimants indisputably satisfy prong one. On the
other hand, in about 15 percent of the successful cases the claimant's average
IQ score4 ° did exceed 70.41 Thus, approximately 15 percent of the Atkins
victories involve defendants whose average intelligence scores only qualify if a
court takes into account measurement error or practice effects. A number of
jurisdictions, including those employing cutoffs, consistently and explicitly
refuse to take into account such errors.42 Finally, a handful of winning claims
involve defendants who had no IQ score under 70,43 a result obviously
precluded in the jurisdictions that impose a cutoff of 70.
an individual's functioning in the upper boundary of mental retardation" and suggesting an
upper range of 75); accord Kay B. Stevens & J. Randall Price, Adaptive Behavior, Mental
Retardation,and the DeathPenalty, 6 J. FoRENsIc PSYCHOL. PRAC. 1,21 (2006) ("Limiting the
determination of mental retardation to a specific IQ score is unacceptable due to multiple factors
such as measurement error and cultural bias.").
38. See Bonnie & Gustafson, supranote 29, at 836 ("[T]he SEM must always be taken
into account when interpreting scores on IQ tests; failing to do so would be a clear departure
from accepted professional practice in scoring and interpreting any kind of psychological test,
including IQ tests.").
39. This figure includes cases in which the IQ score was not specified in the court's
decision. Among the winning cases with IQ scores available, approximately 44 percent did not
have reported scores over 70.
40. We assessed the claimants' average IQ scores by taking the average of all WISC,
Stanford-Binet, WAIS, WAIS-III, WISC-R, WAIS-R, Wechsler Scale, WAIT and WAIS-IV
scores because these tests are recognized in the field to be valid measures of an individual's IQ.
Scores conducted in a group setting, produced by an abbreviated or incomplete test, derived
from an estimate by an expert (rather than a specific test), or some combination thereof were
omitted. We also excluded all scores where the expert who administered the test expressly stated
that he or she believed the subject was malingering.
41. A number of reported rulings, winning and losing, on the first prong did not state the
claimant's IQ scores. We have included those cases in calculating the percentage of successful
cases in which the claimant's IQ is 70 or greater.
42. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 966 So.2d 319,329 (Fla. 2007) ("Under the plain language of
the statute, 'significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning' correlates with an IQ of
70 or below."); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361, 374-75 (Ky. 2005) (stating that
"Atkins did not discuss margins of error" and interpreting statute defining "significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning" as "an intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of seventy (70)
or below" to impose a "bright line cutoff" at 70); Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn.
2004) (interpreting statute demanding "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning
as evidenced by a functional intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of seventy or below" to impose a
"bright line" cutoff at 70). See also note 52.
43. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gibson, 925 A.2d 167, 170 (Pa. 2007) (stating that the
claimant's IQ score ranged from 70 to 75). Jorge Vidal won on Atkins in California with an
HeinOnline -- 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 632 2008-2009
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Not surprisingly, examination of the IQ scores in losing cases also reflects a
variety of approaches. Of the claims that lose on the first prong, approximately
35 percent presented an average IQ below 70. 44 In 21 percent of the losing
cases, there was no reported IQ score of 70 or greater.4 5 This statistic
corresponds to the 17 percent of cases that were successful on the first prong
(establishing IQ scores under 70) but lost nevertheless because the claimant
was unable to establish significant limitations in adaptive functioning. That
leaves 18 percent of the losing cases in which courts faced with scores both
above and below 70 determined that the over-70 IQ score was the most reliable
andprecluded a finding of significantly subaverage intellectual functioning.46
Some of this number reflects determinations that failed to take into account
measurement error and practice effect or applied strict cutoffs on IQ scores.47
For example, in Florida, 50 percent of the losing Atkins claims lost on the first
prong alone, and in half of those cases, the state's cut-off score determined the
outcome.48

average IQ score of approximately 84 and a score as high as 92 on the WAIS-R. People v.
Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 542, 549-50 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). In Vidal's case, however,
there was significant disparity between the verbal IQ score, which was very low, and the
performance IQ score, resulting in a full scale IQ score that exceeded the mild mental
retardation range. Id.
44. Among the lowest IQ scores in losing claims are Eugene Clemons and Clifton
Williams. Clemons v. State, CR-01-1355, 2003 WL 22047260, at *12 (Ala. Crim. App. Aug.
29, 2003) (claimant had a low IQ score of 58 on the Stanford-Binet test and an average IQ score
of approximately 66, and lost on both the first and second prongs); Williams v. State, 270
S.W.3d 112, 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (claimant had a low IQ score of 63 (WAIS-II) and an
average IQ score of approximately 66, and lost on both the first and second prongs). See also
Scott v. State, 878 So.2d 933 (Miss. 2004) (claimant had a low IQ score of 60 on WAIS and an
average IQ score of approximately 67, and lost on the second prong); Ex ParteRodriguez, 164
S.W.3d 400, 402 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (claimant had a low IQ score of 60 on WAIS and an
average IQ score of approximately 66, and lost on the second prong).
45. This figure includes cases where no score was available. See supranotes 27 & 36. The
percentage was 90% among only the losing cases with scores available.
46. See, e.g., Trotter v. State, 932 So.2d 1045, 1050 (Fla. 2006) (relying in part on
defense expert's testimony that IQ score of 88, after proper adjustment for practice and
measurement effects, should be 80); accord Carroll v. Crosby, No. 6:05-cv-857-Orl-3 1KRS,
2008 WL 2557555, at *13 (M.D. Fla. Jun. 20, 2008) (relying on defense expert testimony that
the claimant's IQ was 81).
47. See, e.g., Cherry v. State, 959 So.2d 702, 713-14 (Fla. 2007) (applying strict IQ
cutoff at score of 70, and rejecting Cherry's claim based on IQ score of 72 without considering
the second prong); see also Nixon v. State, 2 So.3d 137, 142-46 (Fla. 2009) (discussing strict
cutoff imposed in Cherry with approval and denying the petitioner's Atkins claim).
48. See, e.g., Nixon, 2 So.3d at 142-46, and Cherry, 959 So.2d at 713-14.
HeinOnline -- 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 633 2008-2009
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B. Prong2 - Adaptive Functioning: Win Rates and Averages
The clinical definitions classify adaptive functioning according to skill sets.
The AAIDD and DSM-IV-TR definitions use different numbers of skill sets.
Accordingly, an individual must establish a deficiency in a different number of
skill sets to meet each definition, even though the definitions are substantively
very similar. For example, when the Court decided Atkins, the AALDD required
significant deficits, or limitations, in adaptive behavior in two of ten skill
areas. 49 Similarly, the APA, in the DSM-IV-TR, required a showing ofadaptive
limitations in two of eleven skill areas.5 ° The AAIDD has since revised its
definition and now measures adaptive deficits in three skill areas rather than
ten, as "the collection of conceptual, social, and practical skills that have been
learned by people in order to function in their everyday lives," and requires a
showing of significant limitations in only one of these areas. 5'
1. Deficits commonly demonstrated
According to our data, the adaptive deficits most often successfully proven
by claimants are deficits in functional academics, which were proven in over 55
percent of the successful Atkins cases, followed by deficits in social skills,
which were proven in just under 40 percent of the winning cases.52 Claimants
established significant
adaptive deficits in work skills in slightly less than 20
53
percent of the cases.

49. See AAMR (9th ed).
50. See DSM-IV-TR.
51. AAMR, supra note 11, at 73. See also id. at 20-23 (table) (chronicling historical
development of the current definition). The definitions of adaptive behavior have retained a
consistent core meaning. See id.at 21-23.
52. Table 2. Decisions do not always list specifically what adaptive deficits the court
finds. In that circumstance, we inferred from the court's decision which defects the defendant
possessed. For example, if, in a case with a winning claim, the defendant was in special
education or the opinion discussed his inability to read or write, we classified that as a finding
of a defect in functional academic skills. Similarly, if the court's decision was not explicit about
the adaptive deficits found, but discussed that the claimant had difficulty speaking or
understanding conversation, we classified this as a finding of a defect in communication skills.
If the State provided what the court considered strong evidence that an adaptive deficit was not
present, and the opinion did not specifically state that the court found the defendant had proven
the deficit, we did not include it. Generally, we included an adaptive deficit in cases where no
specific finding was stated if the evidence for its existence substantially outweighed the State's
counterclaim. When in doubt, we did not classify a deficit as found by a court in the absence of
an express finding.
53. Id.
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TABLE 2
WINNING CASES: ADAPTIVE DEFICITS FOUND54

Functional Academic Skills
Social Skills
Communication Skills
Work Skills

Number of
Winning Atkins
Claims
50
33
29
17

Percent of
Winning Atkins
Claims (88)
57%
33%
36%
19%

2. Reliance on Criminal Competence and Prison Behavior
to Negate Prong 2 Showings
One key operating principle of the clinical definition of mental retardation
is that strengths often coexist with weaknesses. The presence of weaknessesnot the absence of strengths--determines mental retardation.55 Consequently,
relying on the "sophistication" of a defendant's crime to disprove adaptive
functioning deficits, except in extraordinary circumstances, would not be
consistent with accepted clinical practice because the "sophistication" of the
crime is irrelevant to the existence of weaknesses. 56 Another important precept
is that strengths and weaknesses must be assessed in the context of the
individual's community environment.5 7 Thus, evidence of an inmate's activities
in prison is of little value, because the clinical definition of mental retardation
commands that adaptive behavior must be assessed in "typical community
environments," not in circumstances of "legal restraint," such as prison.
54. Most courts assess adaptive functioning according to the skill areas set forth in the
DSM-IV-TR or AAMR. We have used those classifications here. In some cases, the court
found that the defendant established significant adaptive functioning limitations in more than
one skill area.
55. AAMR, supra note 11, at 48.
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. AAIDD, supra note 11, at 14-15. A variety of other problems exist with this
evidence. Often, these assertions, presented via the testimony of corrections officers, prison
wardens, or arresting officers, point to events such as having a magazine subscription or filing a
grievance forn-evidence that provides little insight into an inmate's actual ability. In some
cases, courts are persuaded by this evidence, without asking the more important questions:
whether the prisoner actually read the magazines or books checked out from the library, whether
the grievance form was copied, and so on. It has also been suggested that this testimony poses a
problem because witnesses in corrections or law enforcement may, by virtue of their
professional roles, possess biases against the prisoner. See, e.g., John M. Fabian, Life, Death,
andIQ; It's Much More Than Just a Score: The Dilemma of the Mentally Retardedon Death
Row, 5 J. FoR.ENSIc PSYCHOL. PRAC. 1, 13-14 (2005) (identifying that correctional staff"may be
plagued by certain biases for or against the defendant," "there may be a consensus among staff
that experts are coming to death row to 'get the prisoner off the hook, "' officers may have their
HeinOnline -- 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 635 2008-2009

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 76:625

Misapplication of the clinical definitions is fairly common. In our data set,
nearly 30 percent of the losing cases rely at least in part on the applicant's
prison behavior. In 16 percent of the losing cases, the court expressly found that
the applicant had adapted well to prison, received education while in prison, or
both. In at least 15 percent of the losing cases, the court explicitly relied on
testimony from a corrections officer or an arresting or interrogating law
enforcement officer. And in approximately 5 percent of the losing cases, the
court determined that the applicant did not have mental retardation based, in
some part, on observations of the defendant with legal books or documents.
Most remarkably, in 75 percent of the Florida cases that passed the first prong
but lost on the second, the court's finding of no adaptive functioning limitations
was based in part on the claimant's behavior in prison, orchestration of the
crime, or in-court conduct.
C. Prong3 - Age of Onset
We found only two cases that lost solely on the age-of-onset prong of
Atkins.59 This low number seems consistent with clinical definitions, which
demand no specific form of proof of juvenile onset, but only require some
evidence, which may include medical records or interviews with friends,
family, teachers and others who knew the individual before the age of eighteen.
In both cases that denied Atkins claims for failure to meet the third prong, the
court insisted, however, that proof of onset in the form of a standardized test
score predating the individual's eighteenth birthday was necessary, and that the
absence of such scores defeated the claim.60 These decisions seem patently
wrong, but they are, at least thus far, isolated.
IV.RACIAL EFFECTS
Across the nation, 45 percent of death row inmates are Caucasian, 42
percent are African American, I1 percent are Hispanic, and approximately 2
percent are Asian or Native American. 61 However, of the Atkins claims raised,

own lay opinions on what retardation is and may also not believe these defendants are retarded
because they are criminals and function fairly well in some areas," and some officers are likely
"to have experienced conflicts with the defendants which may cause bias against the defendant
in an evaluative setting").
59. Stallings v. Bagley, 561 F. Supp. 2d 821, 881-86 (N.D. Ohio 2008); State v. Strode,
232 S.W.3d 1, 16-17 (Tenn. 2007).
60. See Stallings, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 881-86; Strode, 232 S.W.3d at 17-18. SomeAtkins
claims that lose on multiple prongs suffer the same error. See, e.g., Rosales v. Quarterman, 291
Fed. App'x 558, 563 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished opinion); Pizzuto v. State, 202 P.3d 642,
651-55 (Idaho 2008); State v. White, 885 N.E.2d 905, 917 (Ohio 2008).
61. See Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.dpic.org (last viewed May 10,
2009).
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57 percent have been raised by African-American defendants,62 22 percent have
been raised by Caucasian defendants, and 12 percent by Hispanic defendants.
Thus, African Americans are markedly overrepresented and Caucasian
markedly underrepresented in Atkins filings.
We can look at race and outcome of Atkins claims from two different
perspectives. Comparing successful petitioners to those on death row, African
Americans are again overrepresented and Caucasians underrepresented. Fiftyseven percent and 18 percent of the successful Atkins claims are filed by
African Americans and Caucasians, respectively, with Hispanic defendants
filing a proportionate 14 percent of the winning claims. Alternatively, we can
compare Atkins winners withAtkins claimants, and see that the rate of wins and
losses within claimants does not seem to vary by race: African Americans file
57 percent of Atkins claims and comprise 57 percent of successful Atkins cases;
Caucasians file 22 percent of the claims and comprise 18 percent of the
winning cases; and Hispanics file 12 percent of the claims and comprise 14
percent of the winning cases.
We also looked at racial patterns by state. Here, we report only those states
in which more than ten Atkins claims have been adjudicated. In most of these
states, the percentage of Atkins claims raised by African-American defendants
substantially exceeds the percentage of African Americans on death row, but
Oklahoma and Pennsylvania do not follow this pattern.63 In Pennsylvania,
African Americans are slightly underrepresented in filed Atkins claims, and in
Oklahoma, they are sharply underrepresented.
TABLE 3
AFRICAN AMERICAN LITIGANTS:
A TKINS CLAIMS BY STATE6"

National
Alabama
Florida
Louisiana
Mississippi
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Texas

62.
63.
64.
number

Percent of Atkins
Claims
57% (232)
62% (26)
59% (17)
91%(11)
71% (14)
76% (21)
80% (15)
15% (13)
50% (12)
63%(46)

Percent of Death
Row Inmates
42%
47%
35%
63%
52%
53%
51%
41%
60%
41%

Table 3.
See Table 3.
Table 3 lists only states in which more than ten Atkins claims have been litigated. The
of claims is in parentheses.
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We also examined the winning rates by state and race. We found variation
here as well. In some states, including Florida, Georgia, Indiana, and
Tennessee, African-American defendants have presented most successful
Atkins claims. In other states, Aflican-American defendants' Atkins claims have
not fared nearly as well as those of Caucasian claimants. In Alabama, twelve
African-American defendants filed Atkins claims and only one won, whereas
two of the seven Caucasian defendants who raised Atkins claims won.
Similarly, in Missouri, of seven claims, African-American defendants raised
four but only one of these defendants won, while two of three Caucasian
defendants who raised Atkins claims prevailed. At this time, we have no
explanation for the variation between states.
More fundamentally, we do not know what explains the disproportionately
high percentage of African-American defendants represented in Atkins claims65
(or conversely, the relatively low percentage of Caucasian defendants).
Perhaps attorneys, following cultural stereotypes, are quicker to see mental
retardation in African-American clients. Perhaps they are not themselves
influenced by those stereotypes, but believe judges and juries will be. Perhaps
there are more African Americans who have mental retardation on death row
because jurors have been less sympathetic to their evidence of mental
retardation when presented in mitigation. Alternatively, perhaps persons with
mental retardation are more likely to engage in criminal activity when they
receive less support and training as children, and because African Americans as
a group are poorer, larger numbers of them have faced the combination of
mental retardation and disadvantage.
Our data do not permit us to eliminate or endorse any of these explanations.
Hoping for some illumination, we examined the average IQ scores of all Atkins
claimants by race. The national average IQ score for African-American Atkins
claimants is 71; the average IQ score for Caucasian claimants is 73; and the
average IQ score for Hispanic claimants is 69.66 The issue is how to interpret
these averages. Perhaps they raise the question of whether too few claims are
being brought on behalf of Hispanic defendants. This hypothesis also gains
some support from the fact that win rates among Hispanic claimants are
somewhat higher than among other racial groups.67
We also report below the breakdown of IQ scores by race and state, though
all we discern here is variation.

65. Cf Taiping Ho, Examination of Racial Disparity in Competency to Stand Trial
Between White andAfrican American RetardedDefendants, 29 J. BLACK STUDIES 771,774-75
(1999) (stating that mentally retarded African Americans are more likely to be judged as
competent to stand trial, despite their overrepresentation in the criminal justice system).
66. Table 4.
67. Conversely, an observer with more of an anti-Atkins bent might infer that too many
claims are being brought on behalf of Caucasian inmates, observing both higher average IQs
and higher loss rates among that group.
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TABLE 4

68
A TKINS CLAIMS: AVERAGE IQ BY RACE

African American

National
Alabama
Florida
Louisiana
Mississippi
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma °9
Pennsylvania
Texas

71
75
74
67
72
67
70
70
73
69

Caucasian

73
71
76
n/a
66
68
75
72
67
72

Hispanic

69
76
66
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
74
59
71

V. CONCLUSION

From this analysis, we infer some good news, some bad news, and some
old news. The floodgates of Atkins litigation have not opened on the courts, nor
have an overwhelming number of frivolous claims been presented. Atkins,
however, has not been applied uniformly among the states. Finally, race
matters, although perhaps in a more complicated way than expected. Our data
show us that Justice Scalia's concerns have gone unfounded, but thatAtkins is
not evenhandedly protecting those it was designed to protect.

68. Table 4 lists only states in which more than 10 Atkins claims have been litigated. For
the number of Atkins claims for these States, see Table 3, supra.
69. Thirty-one percent of the Atkins claims in Oklahoma have been raised by Native
American defendants. The average IQ of those defendants is 74.
HeinOnline -- 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 639 2008-2009

